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Abstract
One-pass authenticated key establishment (AKE)
protocols are arguably better suited to the ID-based
environment than their two-pass counterparts. How-
ever, there is no ID-based one-pass AKE protocol pro-
posed in the literature with a proof of security in an
appropriate model. This paper addresses the current
gap by proposing a new ID-based one-pass AKE pro-
tocol and proving it secure in a formal model. The
security of the new protocol is treated under a model
adapted from a formal security model for traditional
certificate based AKE protocols. The proof of secu-
rity is in the random oracle model and is based on
the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
The protocol also turns out to be the most efficient of
all the previously known protocols. It can work over
a class of asymmetric pairings for better efficiency at
higher bit security levels.
1 Introduction
In an ID-based cryptosystem, the identity of an en-
tity can be used to derive its public key and the
corresponding private key has to be obtained from
a trusted Key Generation Centre (KGC) (Shamir
1984). This simplifies certificate management espe-
cially in non-interactive applications such as e-mail
systems. If Alice wants to send a confidential message
to Bob, she encrypts the message with Bob’s identity
(e.g. e-mail ID). At some stage, possibly after receiv-
ing the encrypted message, Bob approaches the KGC,
proves the ownership of the identity under which the
message was encrypted and obtains the corresponding
private key to decrypt the message.
A simple and very useful feature in ID-based cryp-
tosystems is that the public key of an entity can be
used even before the corresponding private key is gen-
erated. Note that this is not possible in the tradi-
tional certificate-based cryptosystems where one has
to prove the possession of a private key to a certifying
authority (CA) before obtaining a certificate for the
corresponding public key. The cryptographic prim-
itive that most benefits from this special feature is
encryption (Boneh & Franklin 2001). As described
earlier, Alice does not have to obtain Bob’s public
key certificate to encrypt a message to him. How-
ever, if Alice wants to sign a message for Bob, she
first has to obtain a private key from the KGC for
her identity and then use it in signature generation.
At a conceptual level, this is no different from the
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certificate based setting in which case she can send a
public key certificate obtained from a CA along with
the signature.
A natural consequence of using public keys even
before the corresponding private key exists is crypto-
graphic workflow (Paterson 2002) i.e. Alice can en-
crypt a message for Bob at anytime, but Bob will
be given the decryption key only after a predefined
time or after satisfying a specific condition. This
enables Alice to encrypt a message for Bob using
Bob’s identity IDB appended with a future date
(IDB‖future-date). The encrypted message can be
decrypted by Bob only on/after the future-date as the
KGC will not give the corresponding private key be-
fore that. Similarly, Alice can include some access
control information as part of the identity string and
the message encrypted using that string can be de-
crypted by Bob only after producing appropriate au-
thorization information to the KGC. Cryptographic
workflow relies on the fact that the KGC ensures
that a system event has occurred or an action has
been performed before issuing a private key to any
user (Al-Riyami, Malone-Lee & Smart 2006).
Another important primitive that exploits this fea-
ture, to some extent, is the ID-based non-interactive
key distribution protocol of Sakai, Ohgishi & Kasa-
hara (2000). Using this elegant protocol two entities
can agree upon a shared secret just by knowing each
other’s identity, without any communication between
them. The secret key derived using this scheme can
be used along with a symmetric cipher, effectively
achieving ID-based encryption. But, if the private
key of any of the parties is compromised, all the ses-
sion keys or messages encrypted using the secret key
can be recovered. In contrast, for any encryption
mechanism it is reasonable to expect that the compro-
mise of the sender’s private key does not result in the
breach of its security goal. By providing sender for-
ward secrecy, a one-pass AKE protocol just achieves
this. Using an ID-based one-pass AKE protocol, Alice
can generate a shared secret key without interacting
with Bob. This secret key can now be used to en-
crypt messages (possibly into the future) for Bob and
the ephemeral public key that is needed for Bob to
compute the secret key can be sent along with the
encrypted message.
One can argue that a true encryption scheme
should never require a sender to obtain its own private
key to encrypt a message for somebody else (Paterson
2005). If one uses non-interactive key distribution
or a one-pass protocol, the sender first has to ob-
tain its private key only after which the shared se-
cret can be computed. However, we observe that
the resulting composition actually leads to authen-
ticated encryption (or signcryption). Especially, it
has been shown that one-pass AKE and signcryp-
tion KEM are mutually related (Gorantla, Boyd &
Gonza´lez Nieto 2007). We emphasise that an ID-
based one-pass AKE can be used as an ID-based sign-
cryption KEM with outsider security1, thus resulting
in an ID-based version of the outsider secure hybrid
signcryption scheme (Dent 2005).
While it seems that only non-interactive and one-
pass AKE protocols can take some advantage of an
ID-based cryptosystem, it must be noted that two-
pass protocols offer better security properties than
these two variants. As the shared keys are derived
only from long-term private keys, non-interactive pro-
tocols cannot offer any form of forward secrecy. In
one-pass protocols compromise of the recipient’s long-
term private key always enables the adversary to re-
cover all the past session keys. However, this is of
less concern in the case of ID-based setting as period
of validity is normally embedded with identities while
the obtaining private keys. Moreover, one-pass AKE
protocols are still very useful in practice when the
trade-off between security and efficiency is considered.
When a message needs to be encrypted with a shared
secret, they require two less message flows than the
two-pass protocols and at the same time provide bet-
ter security properties than the non-interactive pro-
tocols.
Contributions. We propose the first ID-based
one-pass AKE protocol that is proven secure in a for-
mal model. The protocol is also the most efficient
one of all the known ID-based one-pass AKE proto-
cols. The security of the protocol is analyzed in a new
security model adapted from an existing model for
AKE protocols in the certificate based cryptosystem.
Finally, it is shown that with a few modifications the
protocol can work over a class of asymmetric pairings.
Organization. The remainder of this section
briefly reviews related work and then discusses the in-
formal security goals required for one-pass AKE pro-
tocols. Section 2 briefly describes the properties of
bilinear pairings and the assumptions we make while
proving the security of the proposed protocol. Section
3 presents the adapted security model for ID-based
one-pass AKE protocols. Section 4 describes the pro-
posed protocol over symmetric pairings with a proof
of security. A modified scheme is presented in Sec-
tion 5 that can be implemented over a certain type of
asymmetric pairings. Finally, the paper is concluded
in Section 6.
1.1 Related Work
Krawczyk (2005) presented a two-pass protocol
known as HMQV in the certificate based setting. The
protocol is based on the exponential challenge re-
sponse (XCR) signature proposed in the same paper.
A one-pass variant of HMQV was also proposed based
on the XCR signature, taking the static private key
of the recipient as the challenge. Recently, Chow &
Choo (2007) adapted the XCR signature into the ID-
based environment as the pairing challenge response
(PCR) signature. They then proposed ID-based two-
pass AKE protocols based on the dual version of the
PCR.
Benits Jr & Terada (2004) proposed a one-pass
AKE that is derived from the ID-based encryption
of Boneh & Franklin (2001). This protocol does
not have a proof of security in a formal model and
the weaknesses of it are discussed in Appendix A.
Okamoto, Tso & Okamoto (2005) proposed two ID-
based one-pass AKE protocols without any formal
treatment of their security. Wang (2005) proposed an
ID-based one-pass AKE protocol without a proof of
security and suggested that ID-based one-pass AKE
1The resulting signcryption KEM would be outsider secure for
unforgeability and insider secure for confidentiality if the one-pass
AKE protocol has sender forward secrecy.
along with a symmetric cipher can be used as an ID-
based signcryption scheme.
Due to the advantages of one-pass protocols over
the two-pass protocols in the ID-based setting, it is
important to have an ID-based one-pass AKE proto-
col that can be proven secure in an appropriate formal
model.
1.2 Security Goals
Blake-Wilson, Johnson & Menezes (1997) defined the
desirable security goals of an AKE protocol as below:
known key security: The knowledge of a session key
should not enable an adversary to compromise
other session keys.
(perfect) forward secrecy: A protocol is said to have
perfect forward secrecy if the compromise of
long-term keys of one or more entities does not
lead to compromise of past session keys estab-
lished using those long-term keys.
unknown- key share: If a protocol resists unknown-key
share attacks, an entity A cannot be coerced into
sharing a key with entity B without A’s knowl-
edge, i.e., when A believes the key is shared with
some entity C 6= B.
key compromise impersonation: A protocol is resilient
to key compromise impersonation attacks, if
compromising an entity A’s long-term private
key does not enable the adversary to impersonate
other entities to A.
key control: Neither entity should be able to force the
session key to be a preselected value
Out of the above goals, one-pass AKE protocols can
provide neither perfect forward secrecy nor key com-
promise impersonation resilience. An adversary with
the knowledge of a receiver B’s long-term private key
can always compute all the session keys for the ses-
sions in which it was just passively observing the com-
munication to B. Moreover, if the ephemeral pub-
lic key from A is not explicitly authenticated, the
adversary can always impersonate other users to B.
These attacks are inevitable due to lack of ephemeral
contribution to the session key from B. However,
the weaker forms of the two goals described below
are desirable for one-pass AKE protocols (Okamoto
et al. 2005).
sender forward secrecy: A protocol is said to have
sender forward secrecy if the compromise of long-
term private key of a sender A does not lead to
compromise of past session keys established us-
ing that key.
sender key compromise impersonation: A protocol is
resilient to sender key compromise impersonation
attacks, if compromise of a sender A’s long-term
private key does not enable the adversary to im-
personate other entities to A.
2 Complexity Assumptions
The proposed protocol is based on the bilinear pair-
ings over elliptic curves. In this section, we briefly
describe the properties of symmetric bilinear pairings
and present the hardness assumption on which the
security of the protocol relies.
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Let G be an additive group and GT be a multiplica-
tive group of the prime order q. Let P be an arbitrary
generator of G. The pairing e : G×G→ GT is called
an admissible bilinear map if it has the following prop-
erties:
Bilinear: e(aP, bP ) = e(P, P )ab ∀a, b ∈ Zq
Non-degenerate: e(P, P ) 6= 1
Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(P, P ).
where G is a subgroup of group of points over a su-
persingular elliptic curve E/Fp and GT is a subgroup
of the extension field Fpk .
2.2 Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
The Bilinear Diffie Hellman (BDH) problem is to
compute e(P, P )abc, given an instance 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉,
where P is an arbitrary generator of G and a, b, c ∈R
Z∗q . The advantage of a probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) adversary S in solving the BDH problem is
defined to be :
AdvSBDH = Pr
[A(P, aP, bP, cP ) = e(P, P )abc]
BDH Assumption: For any PPT adversary S the ad-
vantage in solving the BDH problem is negligible.
3 Security Model
Bellare & Rogaway (1993) initiated the formal se-
curity treatment of AKE protocols in the complex-
ity theoretic framework. Later models (Bellare &
Rogaway 1995, Blake-Wilson et al. 1997, Bellare,
Canetti & Krawczyk 1998, Bellare, Pointcheval &
Rogaway 2000, Canetti & Krawczyk 2001) extended
this original idea to capture different attack scenar-
ios. The model proposed by Canetti & Krawczyk
(2001)(CK model) is now widely regarded as the ac-
ceptable model under which the security of an AKE
protocol can be analyzed. However, it is also known
that CK model fails to capture weak forward secrecy
and resilience to key compromise impersonation for
two-pass protocols. Bellare et al. (2000) explained
the inability of a strong corruption model 2 like the
CK model to provide these goals. This argument
equally applies to one-pass AKE protocols.
Recently, LaMacchia, Lauter & Mityagin (2006)
proposed a stronger security model for AKE proto-
cols by extending the CK model (eCK model). The
eCK model is a weak corruption model, where the
adversary is allowed to reveal only the static private
key of a party through Long-Term Key Reveal. This
subtle change helps in capturing more attack scenar-
ios than those covered by the CK model. We adapt
the eCK model to the ID-based setting and analyze
the proposed protocol in the new model.
As in the eCK model and other previous models,
a protocol pi is modelled as a collection of programs
running at different parties, P1, . . . , Pn. Each party
is allowed to have different instances of running the
protocol, modelling the real time scenario of having
multiple sessions open with different partners. The
communications network is controlled by a PPT ad-
versary A, which schedules and mediates all sessions
between the parties. It is also given the power of initi-
ating fictitious parties by obtaining private keys from
2In a strong corruption model, a corrupt query returns all the
internal state information along with the long term private key.
the KGC for arbitrary identities. All the parties (in-
cluding the honest ones) are activated by A. Upon
activation, the parties perform some computations as
per the received communication, update their inter-
nal state and complete the session. The session iden-
tifier sid is assumed to be the concatenation of the
messages exchanged between two parties along with
their identities. Two sessions are said to be matching
sessions if their sid ’s are identical.
Let msk be the master secret key used by the KGC
to issue private keys to the users. A selects identities
of the honest parties and let them obtain private keys
for the identities from the KGC. It is allowed to obtain
private keys for any arbitrary identity of its choice.
During the run of the protocol A is allowed to make
the following queries:
• Send(IDi, IDj ,m): Sends a unique message m to
IDi as having come from IDj and the response of
IDi is returned to A. If m is an empty message
λ, this query activates the party IDi, marking
the role of IDi as an initiator. Otherwise its role
is responder. For one-pass AKE protocols, we
define the sid as the tuple (IDi, IDj ,m, role),
where role ∈ {initiator, responder}.
• Reveal(sid): The session key held in the session
sid is returned to A.
• Long-Term Key Reveal(IDi): This query returns
the long-term private key held by the party IDi.
• Ephemeral Key Reveal(sid): The ephemeral pri-
vate key used in the incomplete session sid is
returned. The response may also include all the
sensitive session state information used by the
party IDi in sid . It may be assumed that the ses-
sion state information is erased from the party’s
memory once the session is completed.
• Extract(IDi): The private key corresponding to
the arbitrary identity IDi is returned.
After the initial stage, the adversary is allowed to
issue a Test query to a clean session sid as defined
below:
• Test(sid): On this query the challenger (the
owner of the session sid) picks a random b ∈
{0, 1}. If b = 0 it returns the session key in the
session sid to A, otherwise a random string from
the session key distribution is returned.
A is allowed to continue with its execution by issuing
the above queries even after the Test query. Finally, it
terminates by outputting its guess b′ on distinguishing
the session key from a random string. A wins the
game if the selected test session is clean and b′ = b.
clean session Let sid be a session completed at a
party IDi and let sid∗ be the matching session at IDj
(there may be no such sid∗). The long-term secret
keys IDi and IDj are denoted by ski and skj . Let
eski and eskj be the ephemeral secret keys used in
sid and sid∗ respectively. A session sid is said not to
be clean if any of the following conditions holds:
• IDi or IDj is an adversary controlled party
(whose private keys are obtained by Extract
queries)
• A reveals the master secret key msk of the KGC
• A reveals the session key held in sid or sid∗ (if
there exists such a sid∗)
• A matching session sid∗ exists and A reveals [ski
and eski] or [skj and eskj ]
• A matching session sid∗ does not exist and A
reveals [ski and eski] or skj
In all other cases the session is said to be clean. For A
to win the game it has to keep the test session clean till
the end of its execution apart from making a correct
guess. The advantage of A is defined as below:
AdvApi = Pr[A wins ]−
1
2
An ID-based AKE protocol pi is said to be secure in
the above model if there exists no PPT adversary that
has non-negligible advantage AdvApi .
3.1 ID-based One-pass protocols
We can further adapt the above definition to suit an
ID-based one-pass AKE protocol. A session sid in an
ID-based one-pass AKE is said not to be clean if any
of the following conditions holds:
• IDi or IDj is an adversary controlled party
(whose private keys are obtained by Extract
queries)
• A reveals the master secret key msk of the KGC
• A reveals the session key held in sid or sid∗ (if
there exists such a matching sid∗)
• A matching session sid∗ exists and
– if sid is an initiator session, A reveals [ski
and eski] or skj
– if sid is a responder session, A reveals ski
or [skj and eskj ]
• A matching session sid∗ does not exist and A
reveals ski or skj
In all other cases the session is assumed to be clean.
The adapted model for ID-based one-pass AKE ex-
plicitly takes into the account the fact that there is no
ephemeral contribution from the responder. However,
as suggested by Krawczyk (2005) we can use a secu-
rity model for two-pass protocols to analyze one-pass
protocols, assuming that an Ephemeral Key Reveal to
a session at the responder returns no information.
As described earlier, A wins the game if it makes
correct guess on a clean test session. For an ID-based
one-pass AKE protocol pi, the advantage of AdvApi
in distinguishing the real session key from a random
value is as defined earlier. pi is considered secure if
AdvApi is negligible.
3.2 KGC Forward Secrecy
In ID-based cryptosystems the knowledge of the mas-
ter secret key of the KGC enables one to compute
private keys of all the users under that KGC. Hence,
compromise of KGC’s master key has to be consid-
ered especially when modelling forward secrecy for
ID-based AKE protocols. This notion of forward se-
crecy is termed as KGC Forward Secrecy (Chen &
Kudla 2002, Chen, Cheng & Smart 2006) in the litera-
ture. Chen & Kudla (2002) stated that KGC forward
secrecy implies perfect forward secrecy. However, we
emphasise that for two-pass protocols it is only weak
forward secrecy that is implied by KGC forward se-
crecy 3. It has also been observed that KGC forward
secrecy results in escrow-free protocols if the KGC
remains passive during the execution of the proto-
col (Chen & Kudla 2002).
3For the same reasons explained by Krawczyk (Krawczyk 2005)
that no two-pass protocol can provide perfect forward secrecy
The security model for ID-based AKE protocols
presented earlier in this section does not take KGC
forward secrecy into account. The definition of clean
session for ID-based two-pass AKE may be changed
as a session is clean only if the adversary with the
knowledge of the master key remains passive during
that session. However, no ID-based one-pass AKE
protocols can offer KGC forward secrecy.
4 The proposed protocol
The one-pass AKE protocol proposed in this section
is based on the symmetric bilinear pairings described
in Section 2.1.
4.1 Setup
The KGC chooses the groups G and GT of prime
order q as described in Section 2.1 for the bilinear
map e. It then selects a master secret s ∈R Z∗q
and an arbitrary generator P of G. The public
key Ppub ∈ G is computed as Ppub = sP . It also
specifies the hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G and
H2 : G× {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q and a key derivation function
K : GT → {0, 1}k, where k is the required length
of the key, taken as security parameter by the KGC.
Note that generic methods exist for implementing a
suitable key derivation function K (Dodis, Gennaro,
H˚astad, Krawczyk & Rabin 2004, Chevassut, Fouque,
Gaudry & Pointcheval 2005).
The public parameters params =
〈G,GT, e, q, P, Ppub, H1, H2〉 are published to all
the users and the master secret s is kept secret to
the KGC itself.
4.2 Extract
This phase is run by the KGC for all the users under
it. On proving the ownership of an identity IDA, A
is issued a private key SA = sQA, where QA is the
public key of A computed as QA = H1(IDA).
4.3 Key Establishment
A picks r ∈R Z∗q , computes R = rQA and sends R to
B over a public channel. It then computes the shared
secret as
kAB = e((r + h)SA, QB)
where h is computed by both the parties as h =
H2(R, IDA‖IDB). Similarly, B computes the shared
secret as
kBA = e(R+ hQA, SB)
Both parties compute the same shared secret kAB =
kBA = e(QA, QB)(r+h)s. The session key is then com-
puted by A as K(kAB) and by B as K(kBA).
The above protocol is derived from the PCR signa-
ture of Chow & Choo (2007) and the one-pass HMQV
of Krawczyk (2005). In the proposed protocol, A
takes the public key of B as challenge and computes
the shared secret as a PCR on it.
4.4 Efficiency
Table 1 shows comparison of our protocol with the ex-
isting ID-based one-pass AKE protocols. The param-
eter sent by A to B and the shared secrets computed
by A and B are placed under the Key Establishment
column. A pairing operation is denoted by P, scalar
multiplication in the group G byM and an exponen-
tiation in GT by ET . Sign and Ver denote the com-
putational cost required for signing and verification
processes of an ID-based signature scheme.
If we let the output of the hash function H2 to be
|q|
2 , the computational cost for the receiver is 0.5M
along with a pairing operation4. Similarly, the pro-
tocol of Wang (2005) can be optimized such that the
computational cost required for the sender is 1P and
2M and that for the receiver is 1P and 1M. The op-
timized version of the proposed protocol is still more
efficient than that of Wang’s protocol.
4.5 Security Analysis
Theorem 1. The proposed ID-based one-pass AKE
protocol is secure (as per the definition in Section
3.1) assuming the hardness of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(BDH) problem with H1, H2 and K modelled as ran-
dom oracles.
Proof. To prove the above theorem, we start by as-
suming the existence of a PPT adversary A that has
a non-negligible advantage (k) against our protocol.
An efficient BDH solver S is then constructed using
A as a subroutine.
Let 〈P, aP, bP, cP 〉 be the BDH instance given to
S, whose goal is compute e(P, P )abc. The view of A
is simulated by S as below:
S picks up the set of identities {ID1, . . . , IDn} for
n users and let m be the maximum number of times
A can activate each user (n and m are polynomials
in the security parameter). S chooses IDA, IDB ∈R{ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn} and t ∈R {1, . . . ,m}. With
these choices S is trying to guess the test session that
will be chosen by A. S’s guess will be correct if A
chooses the t-th session activated at IDA with IDB
as the test session. S sets the public key of the KGC
as aP . The queries of A are answered as below:
H1(IDi) Query: S starts with an empty list LH1 and
on the input IDi it first checks to see if there
is entry for it in LH1 . If there is a match it
returns the stored Qi to A. Otherwise, it chooses
li ∈R Z∗q , computes Qi = liP and returns Qi to
A. The entry (IDi, li, Qi) is stored in the list
LH1 . If i = B, the value bP from its input is
returned and the entry (IDi,⊥, bP ) is added to
the list.
H2 Query: S maintains a list LH2 to ensure that pre-
viously asked queries would receive the same an-
swer. On the input (R, IDi‖IDj) it chooses a
value from Z∗q and returns it to A. The ran-
domly chosen value along with the input is stored
in LH2 .
K Query: S maintains a list LK to ensure the con-
sistency in its responses. On a fresh query it
randomly picks a value from the session key dis-
tribution and returns it to A. The input and
output are stored in LK.
Send(IDi, IDj ,m): The query is handled as below
based on the peers to the session sid :
1. The role of IDi is initiator (m = λ). If
i = A, j = B and this is the t-th session be-
tween them, S randomly chooses τ ∈ Z∗q
and returns Rt = rIτ(cP ). If i = B,S selects αs, hB,s ∈R z∗q , responds with
RB,s = αsP − hB,sQB and stores hB,s as
the response of H2 corresponding to the
query (RB,s, IDB‖IDj). S stores αs in the
list maintained for the session sid . In all
4 Krawczyk (2005) showed that the length of
|q|
2 provides the
right performance-security trade-off.
other cases (including all other session be-
tween IDA and IDB), S chooses a random
li,s ∈ Z∗q and returns Ri,s = li,sQi. The ses-
sion is marked as completed after processing
this query.
2. The role of IDi is responder (m 6= λ). S ac-
cepts the session and marks it as completed.
Reveal(sid): If this is the t-th session between
IDA and IDB , S aborts its simulation (and
also for its matching session) (Event I). If
this session is at IDB , suppose hB,s =
H2(RB,s, IDB‖IDj). S retrieves αs and re-
turns K(e(αs(aP ), Qj)) = K(e(αsP − hB,sQB +
hB,sQB , Qj))a = K(e(RB,s + hB,sQB , Qj))a. In
all other cases, S returns the session key with its
knowledge of the static and ephemeral private
keys.
Extract/Long-Term Key Reveal(IDi): S first checks
to see if there is an entry corresponding to IDi in
LH1 . On no match, it makes a H1 query with the
input IDi. It retrieves the value li from LH1 and
returns li(xP ). Note that an Extract or Long-
Term Key Reveal query on the input IDB does
not have to be simulated by S as per the security
model in Section 3.1. On such a query S aborts
its execution (Event II).
Ephemeral Key Reveal(pisi,j): If this is the t-th session
between IDA and IDB , S outputs “fail”. For all
the sessions at IDB , the Ephemeral Key Reveal
is not handled (Event III). In all other cases, S
returns the corresponding ephemeral private key
it has chosen while answering the Send queries.
Test(sid): If this is not the t-th session between IDA
and IDB , S outputs “fail” (Event IV). sid is
the anticipated session but if it is not clean then
S aborts its simulation (Event V). Otherwise,
S has to return the session key held in the ses-
sion sid or a random value from the session key
distribution after tossing a coin. However, as
shown below S cannot compute the real session
key, which would be of form:
K = K(e(WA,t + hA,tQA, QB)a)
= K(e(rAτ(cP ) + hA,trAP, bP )a)
= K(e((τc+ hA,t)rAP, bP )a)
= K(e(aP, bP )(τc+hA,t)rA)
computing which requires solving the BDH in-
stance 〈aP, bP, crAτP 〉. Hence it returns a ran-
dom value.
Solving the BDH problem: If A can distinguish
a real session key from the given ran-
dom value with non-negligible probability
(k), then it must have issued a K-query
with the input e(aP, bP )(τc+hA,t)rA =
e(aP, bP )c(rAτ)e(aP, bP )hA,trA . Now S
randomly chooses an entry σ from LK
and answers the BDH challenger with
(σ/(e(aP, bP )hA,trA))1/(rAτ). If σ is same
as the one that was queries by A in answering its
guess, the answer by S would be correct (Event
VI).
Probability Analysis : S does not abort during its
simulation if the events I, II and V do not occur i.e.,
A keeps the anticipated test session clean. Hence,
these events do not occur if A chooses the t-th session
between IDA and IDB as the test session. S does not
Key Establishment Computational Cost
Parameter Shared secret Sender Receiver
Benits Jr & Terada (2004) rP ,Sig(K) A : e(rQB , Ppub) 1P + 2M+Sign 1P + Ver
B : e(SB , R)
Okamoto et al. (2005) I rQA e(SA, QB)
r
⊕
e(SA, QB) 1P + 1M+ 1ET 2P
e(RA, SB)
⊕
e(QA, SB)
e(hSA + rPpub, QB)
Okamoto et al. (2005) II rP e(hQA +R,SB) 1P + 3M 1P + 1M
h = H2(R)
e(hQB +QB , (r + h)SA)
Wang (2005) rQA e(hQA +R, (1 + h)SB) 1P + 3M 1P + 2M
h = H2(R,QB)
e((r + h)SA, QB)
Our Protocol rQA e(R + hQA, SB) 1P + 2M 1P + 1M
h = H2(R, IDA‖IDB)
Table 1: Comparison with existing protocols
output “fail” if the events III and IV do not occur.
Event III happens if A issues an Ephemeral Key Reveal
query which S cannot handle i.e. for an Ephemeral
Key Reveal query at the m(n− 1) maximum possible
sessions at IDB(including the test session).
Pr[III] = 1− m(n− 1)
mn(n− 1) =
n− 1
n
Event IV happens if A does not choose the session
anticipated by S as the test session.
Pr[IV ] =
1
mn(n− 1)
Let ask be the event that A asks the critical K query
with the input σ. The success probability of A is
given as
SuccA = Pr[SuccA|ask]Pr[ask] +
Pr[SuccA|ask]Pr[ask]
≤ Pr[ask] + 1
2
Let SuccS be the event S wins the game against
the BDH challenger. Clearly, SuccS wins its game
only if Pr[ask] 6= 0. If Pr[ask] 6= 0 the probability
of S choosing the correct entry σ from the list LK is
Pr[V I] = 1NK , where NK is number K queries asked
by A.
Pr[SuccS |ask] = Pr[III ∧ IV ∧ V I]
=
n− 1
n
1
mn(n− 1)
1
NK
=
1
mn2NK
Let the advantage of A, winning the game i.e. distin-
guishing the real session key from a random number
be AdvA(k) = (k). The success probability of S in
solving the BDH is given as.
Pr[SuccS ] ≥ Pr[SuccS |ask]Pr[ask]
=
1
mn2NK
(
SuccA − 12
)
=
(k)
mn2NK
Since we assumed that (k) is non-negligible, S can
solve the BDH with the probability Pr[SuccS ], which
is also non-negligible. This is a contradiction to the
BDH assumption. Hence, there exists no PPT ad-
versary against our protocol that has non-negligible
advantage.
5 Construction using Asymmetric Pairings
A more general form of an admissible bilinear map is
eˆ : G1 ×G2 → GT . For a Type 4 pairing (Chen et al.
2006), G1 is a cyclic subgroup of the group of points
over the elliptic curve E/Fp that is of order q and G2
is a group of points over E/Fpk that is of order q2 and
GT is a cyclic subgroup of the multiplicative group of
the finite field Fpk that is of order q. Let P1 and
P2 be arbitrary generators of G1 and G2 respectively.
There exists an efficient isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1
such that ψ(P2) = P1.
The bilinear map e described in Section 2.1 is a
special case of eˆ with G1 = G2, called as Type 1 pair-
ing (Galbraith, Paterson & Smart 2006). The scheme
presented in Section 4 is based on this type of pair-
ings. Type 1 pairings can be implemented only on
the limited class of supersingular curves. Moreover,
cryptosystems using these pairings can be efficiently
implemented only for 80-bit security level. For more
details on types of pairings and description of the un-
derlying groups we refer the reader to Galbraith et al.
(2006) and Chen et al. (2006).
5.1 BDH problem on asymmetric pairings
Chen et al. (2006) defined BDHi,j,k problem as for
a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , given (aPi, bPj , cPk), i, j, k ∈ {1, 2}, com-
pute eˆ(P1, P2)abc. It is assumed that BDHi,j,k prob-
lem is computationally hard in 〈G1,G2, eˆ〉.
5.2 Modified Protocol
Now, we briefly describe a modified version of the
protocol in Section 4 that can be implemented over
Type 4 pairings.
In the Extract phase the KGC now uses a hash
function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G2 that maps the identity
strings to the group G2. Hence the public key QA
of a user A is in G2. The private key SA ∈ G2 of a
user A is computed in the same way using the master
secret.
In the Key Establishment phase A picks r ∈R Z∗q ,
computes R = rψ(QA) and sends it to B over a public
channel. It then computes the shared secret as
kAB = e((r + h)ψ(SA), QB)
Similarly, B computes the shared secret as
kBA = e(R+ hψ(QA), SB)
where h is computed as earlier. The shared secret now
is kAB = kBA = e(ψ(QA), QB)(r+h)s. The session
key K is then computed by A as K(kAB) and by B
as K(kBA).
The modified scheme falls into the Category 3 as
identified by Chen et al. (2006).
Theorem 2. The modified ID-based one-pass AKE
protocol on asymmetric pairings is secure (as per the
definition in Section 3.1) assuming the hardness of
BDH2,2,1 problem with H1, H2 and K modelled as
random oracles.
The proof of this theorem is very similar to that
of the Theorem 1 and the details are omitted.
6 Conclusion
We have proposed the first ID-based one-pass AKE
protocol with a concrete security analysis in a for-
mal model. To analyze the security of the scheme, a
formal security model for AKE protocols in the cer-
tificate based cryptosystem has been adapted to the
ID-based environment. The protocol is also more effi-
cient than any of the known ID-based one-pass AKE
protocols. Moreover, the protocol is modified to work
over asymmetric pairings implemented over a class of
elliptic curves.
It is an open question to design a one-pass AKE
protocol in the standard model. It will also be in-
teresting to see secure one-pass protocols on Type 3
pairings, which can be implemented more efficiently.
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A The security of Bentis Jr. and Terada’s
protocol
Benits Jr & Terada (2004) derived a one-pass AKE
protocol from the ID-based encryption of Boneh &
Franklin (2001).
The sender A picks r ∈ Z∗q and sends U = rP
to B with whom it wants establish a session key. A
computes the session key as K(e(rQB , Ppub)), whereas
B computes the same key as K(e(SB , U)).
The authors identified that the above protocol can-
not authenticate A to B. We now briefly analyze the
security weaknesses of the protocol due to lack of this
authentication.
This protocol offers known key security as the
ephemeral private key is chosen as a uniformly ran-
dom element of Z∗q . It also offers sender’s forward
secrecy simply because the sender’s private key is not
used in the session key computation. However, due
lack of implicit authentication of A to B, an adver-
sary can send U ′ = r′P to B as having come from
A and mount an unknown key share attack using its
knowledge of r′. An adversary with the knowledge of
the private key of A can perform sender key compro-
mise impersonation by sending U ′′ as impersonating
some other party to A and compute the session key.
The protocol is then modified to offer mutual au-
thentication by signing the session key with the ID-
based signature of Hess (2003). The user A now
sends the signature on the session key along with U
to B. The authors claimed that the modified proto-
col is secure without giving any formal proof of se-
curity. However, this protocol is still insecure under
the model defined in Section 3.1. If an Ephemeral Key
Reveal query is issued to any session at A, the adver-
sary can easily compute the session key held in the
session, as the long term private key of A is not used
in the session key computation.
